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My research into British cultural policy-making and the so-called creative economy has 
led me to consider the role of experts in producing the discourse of creativity 
(Schlesinger 2007; 2009a).1 To date, the efforts of critics to deconstruct the creative 
economy have had little effect on its salience as a focus of policy-making (Bustamante 
(ed.) 2011). Moreover, research on the topic is growing and it is increasingly 
institutionalised in learning and teaching. One long-standing advocate of the cause, Stuart 
Cunningham (2009: 375), sees the depth of opposition to the creative economy amongst 
critical scholars as ‘a textbook case of the disabling gap between policy and critique’. 
However, rather than academics constituting two opposed camps – those of  ‘policy’ and 
‘critique’ – in reality, a much more nuanced situation prevails.  
 
The polemical context that dogs the creative economy makes it a particularly apt case for 
a discussion of the role of academics in ‘cultural governance’. Tony Bennett (2007: 12) 
has characterised one key feature of this practice as that of ‘producing work that might 
have an impact on actually existing cultural policies’. Although favouring such 
interventions by academics, Bennett emphasises that they not should cease ‘to be critical 
of such policies’ where criticism is merited.  
 
To be a critic as well as a kind of insider raises hard questions about whether one can 
actually ride two horses at once. Contemporaneous criticism may be limited by the rules 
of the game into which one has entered – for instance, by observing official secrecy laws 
or confidentiality agreements. Or – much more subtly – by accepting the trade-offs that 
arise between obtaining access and the discretion that keeps the field open.  
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Bennett does not consider such points but focuses instead on the need to criticise official 
rhetoric that obscures real intentions or undesirable outcomes. It is not clear, however, 
when such criticism occurs or ought to occur. We should also note the term ‘having an 
impact’ in Bennett’s account because this has assumed a new potency in my own, British, 
academic context (Collini 2012: ch9). And as I shall seek to show, the emerging regime 
for evaluating academic research gives a reductive twist to how we may now and in 
future think about our involvement in advising cultural bodies. The transformation of 
positive civic engagement into an obligatory demonstration of accountability was 
certainly not in Bennett’s mind. 
 
If cultural governance is the descriptor à la mode then like Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain - 
who discovered he’d been speaking prose for 40 years without realising it – it appears 
that unknowingly I have been long involved in the practice. During the past two decades I 
have advised government departments, a national research council, a legislature and 
cultural agencies. I currently chair the UK communications regulator Ofcom’s Advisory 
Committee on Scotland.  
 
Such uses of academic expertise (in this connection, for purposes of cultural governance) 
are a special case of a general sociology of how intellectuals use their knowledge. To a 
great extent, current arguments about how to situate intellectuals derive from structural 
changes in capitalism since World War II and the emergence of a so-called knowledge 
economy. The growth of the service sector has changed how social science analyses and 
values expertise. 
 
Thus, in post-industrial mood, during the 1970s Alvin Gouldner (1979) wrote about the 
putative emergence of a powerful class of symbol-manipulating intellectuals immersed in 
a ‘culture of critical discourse’. In a more current take, Richard Florida (2002) has 
celebrated the rise and flight of the ‘creative class’, which has resonated with 
governments around the world seeking by all means to install competitive creative 
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economies. Both Gouldner and Florida – like Daniel Bell (1973) before them – have tried 
to paint new pictures of class and power as industrial society is left increasingly behind.  
 
There is also a discourse more specifically centred on intellectuals’ normative roles. For 
instance, Zygmunt Bauman (1992) has argued that in post-modernity the role of 
intellectuals has shifted from ‘legislator’ to ‘interpreter’, to making sense of cultures 
while being largely disconnected from power. For his part, Edward Said (1994) has 
maintained that the choice is either to work inside the power structure or be powerless, 
celebrating the role of the intellectual as outsider.  
 
Contrary to Bauman, contemporary intellectuals are not all simply interpreters. There is 
good empirical evidence that the desire to legislate for how culture should be shaped 
through policy remains very powerful in our times as the intellectual work undertaken in 
building the case for the creative economy shows. Said’s all-or-nothing approach to what 
intellectual life ought to be polarises intellectuals into the co-opted v the free. This 
schema distorts the actual complexity of how contemporary intellectuals (academics 
included) address the world of policy and politics. 
 
As it happens, Theodor Adorno (1991: 89) provided a more nuanced view of the role of 
expertise in cultural policy. He believed that a critically self-aware cultural policy was 
feasible and that expertise could be used ‘for the protection of cultural matters from the 
realm of control by the market’. He also thought that experts working within institutions 
to pursue culturally progressive ends could – in Bauman’s terms - be legislators rather 
than just interpreters. And that is what my own research suggests. Whether the ends 
pursued are necessarily or invariably ‘progressive’ is quite another matter.  
 
The creative economy debate is a pertinent illustration of academics’ and other 
intellectuals’ undoubted legislative impulse. It relates instructively to the potentially 
changing scope for academic autonomy due to shifts in the structure of the research 
economy, of which the UK is an exemplary case.  
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The creative economy and expertise 
From the outset, creative industries policy in the UK emphasised individuals as creators 
and subordinated culture to economics. It was neo-liberal and pragmatic and by using one 
comprehensive label aggregated an arbitrary grouping of diverse cultural, communicative 
and technological practices (DCMS 1998).  
 
This policy framework had preconditions. For instance, it could not have come about 
without a prior focus on cultural industries by left interventionist projects that aimed to 
make the nation, city or locality more competitive in the global market place (Garnham 
1990 [1984]; Miège 2004 [1984]).  
 
Creative industries policy made in London has now circled the globe and is widely seen 
as offering a solution to the problem of how to make creativity profitable. Doubt about 
the efficacy of policy implementation and the data on which it is based has not prevented 
the rampant diffusion of ideas. There are differences in how variants of creative economy 
thinking play out in different territories but there is a broadly common agenda to which 
capitalising on the economic value of culture is central.  
 
Creative industries discourse was developed as a political project of the ‘policy 
generation’ at the heart of British New Labour in government. Think tanks and other 
forms of expertise - such as that provided by policy advisers and industry figures – 
contributed significantly to shaping the policy process. Recognised as accredited experts 
by those in power, key individuals moved from advocacy in think tanks into positions of 
strategic influence in politics, media and communications regulation. Researching this 
theme led me to conclude that we clearly need a renewed focus into the struggle for 
power and influence by ideas-producers in the policy marketplace. And cultural 
governance is surely one significant instance. 
 
The sheer pervasiveness of creativity discourse as a synonym for dynamism, growth, 
talent formation and national renewal has been quite remarkable. Herein lies its 
attractiveness. It resonates with the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ analysed by Luc Boltanski 
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and Ève Chiapello (2005). Indeed, there is a striking convergence between recent 
management and creative industries thinking (Thrift 2006; Bilton and Cummings 2010; 
Schlesinger 2010).  
 
Over the past fifteen years, British academics have become increasingly involved in the 
creative industries agenda both as advocates and detractors. In a quite fluid scene, some 
have worked as consultants and subsequently become academics; others have been 
academics and also worked as consultants or advisers. Some have been both part-time 
academics and consultants. Some leading figures, authors of major reports to 
government, have made their way from journalism, media commentary and elite policy 
circles into university posts. At times, too, there has been close co-operation between 
some academics and think tanks and government departments. Thus, the role of policy 
intellectuals in cultural governance is both demonstrable and also quite complex, with 
some individuals shifting or combining roles over time. These relations are not easily 
classifiable as ‘policy’ v ‘critique’. 
 
The sustained interest by successive British governments in the topic means that the 
process of institutionalising the creative economy agenda in British universities has been 
notable. For instance, there has been an increased commitment by the UK Research 
Councils to enterprise-oriented research on the creative economy and the ‘digital 
economy’. This has been coupled with a particular model of investigation that justifies its 
relevance to the taxpayer by undertaking what is now called ‘knowledge exchange’. 
According to one typical definition: 
 
Knowledge exchange is the process by which knowledge, expertise and skilled people 
exchange between research in universities and their user communities to contribute to 
economic development, effectiveness of public services, policy and quality of life. 
(Universities Scotland, 2011: 1) 
 
It is no accident that economic development heads the list. A key initiative by the UK 
Research Councils has been the establishment of five new university-based centres 
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around the UK. Four of these are so-called ‘knowledge exchange hubs for the creative 
economy’ and the fifth is a ‘centre for copyright and new business models for the creative 
economy’. I must declare an interest. I was involved in leading an unsuccessful, but 
shortlisted, bid for a ‘knowledge exchange hub’ and, at this time of writing, I am highly 
involved in implementing the successful bid for the copyright centre.2  
 
These initiatives mobilise significant numbers of academic researchers and organise their 
connections with a range of enterprises, public bodies and governments. The broad 
programmatic approach does not necessarily exclude any particular project nor does it 
preclude the possibility of critique. The driving aim, however, is to build up specific 
sectors of the national economy in conditions of global competitiveness.  
 
To engage in ‘knowledge exchange’ to this end is not always a simple process. The 
metaphor evokes a frictionless movement of ideas from one party to another, offering an 
image of reciprocity and mutual edification. This tends to ignore the fact of  ‘knowledge 
resistance’, where some arguments about policy from advisers are simply unwelcome and 
therefore discounted (Schlesinger 2009b; Williamson et al 2011). Resistance comes about 
for a number of reasons – for instance, the defence of economic interests, institutional 
inertia and the obstructive presence of established intellectual orthodoxies. For those 
engaged in cultural governance having advice rejected or ignored is not unusual. And of 
course, this kind of rejection is common across the policy space in general. 
 
As it now looms so large, I would suggest that ‘knowledge exchange’ in the cultural 
policy field is not only an objective to be pursued at the behest of government and 
research and funding councils. Because it is so inherently problematic, it is also a highly 
interesting researchable process whose workings may give us many insights into power 
relations and the effectiveness of state intervention in the field of cultural governance.  
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Global governance 
The British case is not unique and it is instructive to note how related processes of ideas 
production and advocacy have made major inroads at the supranational and global levels. 
The pursuit of a creative economy has indeed become globalised and has entered the 
sphere of global governance, while being addressed in quite distinctive ways in different 
places. 
 
For instance, the UN standing Conference on Trade and Development’s Creative 
Economy Report (UNCTAD 2008) was intended to be an agenda-changing publication 
that aimed to extend the debate from the advanced capitalist economies to those of 
developing states. Today’s new world cultural order enjoins us to embrace the creative 
economy as an aspiration for all, irrespective of the stage of development or regime. 
Intellectual property is at its heart, there to be both protected and ostensibly to incentivise 
cultural production.  
 
However, given the major conceptual weight of ‘culture’ in the UN’s mapping of the 
world (UNESCO 2002) it is not surprising that the eventual model combined ‘core 
cultural industries’ with the ‘creative industries’, each presented as related but distinct.  
 
The first behind-the-scenes steps on the road to the Creative Economy Report 2008 began 
in 2004 when a specialist panel in which academics played a role - argued that creativity 
is ‘a ubiquitous asset, present in all countries’. It set out to ‘transform[…] cultural 
industries into creative industries as developmental forces for change and a new growth 
opportunity’. The Panel’s goal was to establish the conditions for building creative 
industries in developing countries and to ‘identify a set of national and international 
policy recommendations’ to that end (UNCTAD 2004: 4-5; emphases added). 
 
Around the same time, in 2005, WIPO established its Creative Industries Division ‘to 
provide a focal point for related policy and industry discourse’ focused on the ‘central 
role that could be played by intellectual property in enhancing the wealth creation 
potential of the creative industries sector’ (WIPO nd: np). 
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Typical of a networked international body, WIPO’s ‘key meetings’ over several years 
reveal first, the mechanisms whereby ideas transmission takes place – seminars, 
conferences, round-tables, expert meetings; and second, the geographical spread of such 
activities. This is how a perspective is globalized in routine institutional practice.  
 
As at the national level, the discourse produced inside the world of global governance is 
frequently the work of experts seeking practical solutions to problems faced by 
international organisations (Badaró 2011). The expert sphere is not private but nor is it 
really public. While reports and working papers are often easily accessible from the web, 
there are steep costs of entry into being able to make good sense of them, and more 
importantly, being able to develop a critique and enter into a specialist debate with any 
hope of having an effect. 
 
The expert space – whether at a global or national level - has become the ready substitute 
for wider democratic engagement. Inviting consultations from all interested parties in 
response to the publication of policy documents is often a disingenuous process, as only 
those with the resources – intellectual capital, money and time – can make a serious 
response.  
 
Academics and expert space 
Over the past three decades, as my illustrative case of the creative economy shows, a 
significant number of academics have contributed to cultural governance, as an integral 
part of the wider policy intelligentsia. For the most part, how individuals comport 
themselves does not easily fit a polar opposition between ‘policy’ and ‘critique’. But the 
continuing tensions between those polarities do need further discussion. 
 
Most of the policy game plays itself out inside states because these have provided the 
main framework for pursuing contemporary cultural policy – characteristically, a top-
down process of formulation and implementation. Not surprisingly, then, it is precisely 
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here where the bulk of expert effort is directed and expended because that is still the 
dominant mode of organisation of policy communities. 
 
Even given such processes as European integration or academic collaboration with 
international bodies, the politics of cultural policy still mainly operates within national 
political systems and public spheres – that is, within states. Consequently, the state can 
be a useful analytical framework for many purposes, not least for cultural governance. 
But we must also recognise the limitations of this approach because the idea of cultural 
and communications sovereignty is challenged by the existence of global cultural flows 
and transnational systems of governance.  
 
Under contemporary conditions, academics’ policy-relevant expertise has become a key 
criterion for credible entry into debate. There has been a century-long debate in 
sociological thought on this question. Walter Lippmann, writing shortly after World War 
I, endorsed a special place for an intellectual elite in policy making (1961 [1922]). This 
called for new forms of legitimation, not least reasoned analysis. Subsequently, shortly 
after World War II, Robert K. Merton (1949: 167) shifted the emphasis towards the ideal 
of professionalism, to ‘the responsible exercise of specialized competence by experts’. 
Public trust in expertise entailed procedural accountability that must be open to 
inspection and testing. 
 
In our own time, Michael Schudson (2006: 499-501) has characterised experts as —
ideally — speaking truth to power, clarifying the grounds of public debate, and offering a 
diagnostic service. But this ignores the fact that the acquisition of expertise creates 
barriers between those with know-how and those without. Experts may lose their critical, 
democratic edge when faced by the seduction of power and influence. Furthermore, even 
a well-educated public may not be able to muster the requisite arguments in forms 
capable of counterbalancing insider know-how. In short, being able to take a critical 
distance from expertise still matters, given the continuing — and indeed, growing —
importance of expert knowledge for the policy process.  
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In the UK, the pressure to become an expert with a public face is growing inside 
academia. As elsewhere, the framework of research in which we work is currently greatly 
shaped by the quest for competitive economic growth and this is in turn increasingly 
shaping the intellectual agenda. I have already noted the flow of funds to support research 
and knowledge exchange on the creative economy. There is a further contextual factor I 
should mention – the potential effects of the UK’s new Research Excellence Framework, 
or REF.  
 
This is the latest variant of the five-yearly assessment of British academics’ research. The 
judgements made have two key consequences for every individual and research group in 
each university. First, the grades awarded for the quality of research have financial 
implications – the higher the rating, the greater the flow of research funds. Second, and at 
least as important, the grades received are markers of prestige and crucial both to external 
marketing and internal morale. A new refinement in 2014 will be to require research 
groups to submit case studies of the ‘impact’ of their research. This plays a new and 
significant role in how research is legitimised. ‘Impact’ is defined as ‘an effect on, 
change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the 
environment or quality of life, beyond academia…’ (REF2014, 2011: 48; emphasis 
added) 
 
This new requirement is already having interesting normative consequences. Academics 
asked to produce case studies of their work have re-evaluated their own past findings in 
new ways to fit the criteria. A new cadre of persuaders has found employment as the 
rhetoricians of impact. Moreover, as the impact agenda will figure in future assessments, 
we can be quite sure that a significant proportion of projects being designed now and in 
the future will factor in the new obligation to account for impact in according to the new 
requirements with consequences for risk and innovation in research yet to be understood.  
 
Conclusion 
We should distinguish between two quite different kinds of rationale for expert 
engagement as a form of cultural governance.  
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First, under ideal, unconstrained conditions, our research practice would lead us, as a 
matter of course, to contribute to discussion and deliberation through various forms of 
public engagement. This might and does include the production and publication of 
independent research. It might also entail academics joining boards and commissions, 
supplying expert advice to governments and agencies, advising parliamentary 
committees, making submissions to public inquiries, offering assistance to civil society 
organisations, contributing to media and so forth. The key matter in question is the 
legitimation invoked for doing this. Why we might act in such ways has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the new ‘impact’ agenda. This novel bureaucratic imperative has 
added a distinctive calculation to activities that have never before been expressly and 
principally driven by the need to increase university research funding or to secure 
collective prestige. Rather, for the kinds of public engagement I have already described, 
the actions taken derive from an interest in the dissemination of knowledge and a 
commitment – as citizen-academics - to use our knowledge for the general benefit. No-
one can guarantee that such activity will have a demonstrable impact. Nor should we 
have to do so. 
 
Because at least some universities continue to give us the requisite space, academics are 
particularly well placed to make a disinterested contribution to public policy. Disinterest 
does not imply a lack of commitment to values and ideals. It concerns whether or not we 
seek to secure direct or indirect benefits from our advice and especially whether or not 
material or symbolic reward is a prime motivation for action. This relatively autonomous 
form of engagement is based on a pro-active, supply-led model. Ideal-typically, you 
develop ideas yourself and you freely offer them to others. 
 
Second, there is another quite distinct driving force that shapes contemporary policy 
analysis - as indeed it shapes the production of academic knowledge as a whole. That is 
the pressure that originates in the audit society in which we now all work. In economic 
and political terms, our funding and public validation come from being seen to hit targets 
set by increasingly detailed performance indicators. These criteria include the assessment 
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of the frequency, volume and influence of our publications as well as our universities’ 
international standing and where we sit in national league tables. There is, furthermore, in 
the shape of the impact agenda, an intensifying officially-policed obligation to help 
public agencies, commerce, business and industry, and also voluntary and charitable 
bodies, to operate knowledgeably in a democratic society. As opposed to the first model 
of an internalised culture that supplies the public sphere with spontaneously generated 
intellectual work, this is a necessity-driven, demand-led model. Ideal-typically, you 
produce research and engage in knowledge exchange in line with what is requested in 
order to justify your existence. Public intellectuality, therefore, is wanted but only on 
certain, quite instrumental, terms. 
 
Today, therefore, the normative model of autonomous intellectuality – the ideal of 
freedom of thought – is in increasing tension with the dominant system- and market-
driven model of the knowledge class. The first model (that of freedom) is increasingly 
being displaced by the second (that of necessity). Indeed, the demands of necessity have 
become normative: they’re settled in our very bones. Can we at various times be certain 
which norms we’re obeying? Are we thinking for ourselves or for someone else?  Or – 
more likely – doing both, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes sequentially?  
 
It is clear – contrary to Zygmunt Bauman – that some academics do still seek legislative 
power. They aren’t just interpreters. And, if the impact agenda becomes more 
widespread, we can be confident that many more will be driven by bureaucratic necessity 
rather than by intellectual or civic conviction into attempts at cultural governance.  
 
It is plain that our paymasters’ demand to justify the impact of what we do will intensify, 
rather than slacken. But this pressure occurs under rather paradoxical conditions. My own 
experience – and that of others - suggests that being able to demonstrate the impact of 
your expertise in any given policy domain is actually very difficult. Ignoring this, the 
dominant discourse celebrates only efficacious knowledge exchange. This banishes any 
serious consideration of knowledge resistance. Consequently, a major challenge will be 
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to find novel ways of ensuring that inconvenient truths circulate with significant effect in 
the public domain. 
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Notes 
1  This is a highly abridged version of a central session paper presented at the VII 
International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Barcelona, 9-12 July 2012. I have 
picked up from and developed earlier reflections in Schlesinger 2001 and 2009b. 
2  This is called CREATe, the Centre for Creativity, Regulation, Enterprise and 
Technology. Established in October 2012, it is a consortium of seven UK universities, 
headquartered at the University of Glasgow. 
 
